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Abstract—The rapid growth of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks in
the past few years has brought with it increases in transit cost
to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), as peers exchange large
amounts of traffic across ISP boundaries. This ISP oblivious
behavior has resulted in misalignment of incentives between P2P
networks—that seek to maximize user quality—and ISPs—that
would seek to minimize costs. Can we design a P2P overlay that
accounts for both ISP costs as well as quality of service, and
attains a desired tradeoff between the two? We design a system,
which we call MultiTrack, that consists of an overlay of multiple
mTrackers whose purpose is to align these goals. mTrackers split
demand from users among different ISP domains while trying to
minimize their individual costs (delay plus transit cost) in their
ISP domain. We design the signals in this overlay of mTrackers
in such a way that potentially competitive individual optimization
goals are aligned across the mTrackers. The mTrackers are also
capable of doing admission control in order to ensure that users
who are from different ISP domains have a fair chance of being
admitted into the system, while keeping costs in check. We prove
analytically that our system is stable and achieves maximum
utility with minimum cost. Our design decisions and control
algorithms are validated by Matlab and ns-2 simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years have seen the rapid growth of con-
tent distribution over the Internet, particularly using peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks. Recent studies estimate that 35-90% of
bandwidth is consumed by P2P file-sharing applications, both
at the edges and even within the core [1], [2]. The use of
P2P networks for media delivery is expected to grow still
further, with the proliferation of legal applications (e.g. Pando
Networks [3]) that use P2P as a core technology.
While most P2P systems today possess some form of
network resource-awareness, and attempt to optimally utilize
the system resources, they are largely agnostic to Internet
Service Providers’ (ISP) concerns such as traffic management
and costs. This ISP-oblivious nature of P2P networks has
hampered the ability of system participants to correctly align
incentives. Indeed, the recent conflicts between ISPs and
content providers, as well as efforts by some ISPs such as
Comcast to limit P2P traffic on their networks [4], speak in part
to an inability to align interests correctly. Such conflicts are
particularly critical as P2P becomes an increasingly prevalent
form of content distribution [5].
A traditional BitTorrent system [6] has elements called
Trackers whose main purpose is to enable peers to find
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Fig. 1. The MultiTrack architecture. Multiple trackers, each following
individual optimizations, achieve an optimal delay-cost tradeoff.
each other. The BitTorrent Tracker randomly assigns a new
(entering) user a set of peers that are already in the system to
communicate with. This system has the disadvantage that if
peers who are assigned to help each other are in the domains of
different ISPs, they would cause significant transit costs to the
ISPs due to the inter-ISP traffic that they generate. However, if
costs are reduced by forcing traffic to be local, then the delay
performance of the system could suffer. Recent work such as
[7]–[9] has focused on cost in terms of load balancing and
localizing traffic, and developed heuristics to attain a certain
quality of service (QoS). For example, P4P [8] develops a
framework to achieve minimum cost (optimal load balancing)
among ISP links, but its BitTorrent implementation utilizes the
heuristic that 30% of peers declared to each requesting user
should be drawn from “far away ISPs” in order to attain a
good QoS.
This leads us to the fundamental question that we attempt
to answer in this paper: Can we develop a distributed delay
and cost optimal P2P architecture? We focus on developing a
provably optimal price-assisted architecture called MultiTrack,
that would be aware of the interaction between delay and cost.
The idea is to understand that while the resources available
with peers in different ISP domains should certainly be used,
such usage comes at a price. The system must be able to
determine the marginal gain in performance for a marginal
increase in cost. It would then be able to locate the optimal
point at which to operate.
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The conceptual system1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The
system is managed by a set of mTrackers. Each mTracker is
associated with a particular ISP domain. The mTrackers are
similar to the Trackers in BitTorrent [6], in that their main
purpose is to enable peers to find each other. However, unlike
BitTorrent, the mTrackers in MultiTrack form an overlay net-
work among themselves. The purpose of the overlay network
is to provide multi-dimensional actions to the mTrackers. In
Figure 1, mTracker 1 is in steady state (wherein the demand
on the mTracker is less than the available capacity [11]),
which implies that it has spare capacity to serve requests from
other mTrackers. Consider mTracker 2 which is in transient
state (wherein the demand on the mTracker is more than
the available capacity [11]). When a request arrives, it can
either assign the requester to its own domain at essentially
zero cost, or can forward the user to mTracker 1 and incur a
cost for doing so. However, the delay incurred by forwarded
users would be less as mTracker 1 has higher capacity. Thus,
mTracker 2 can trade-off cost versus delay performance by
forwarding some part of its demand.
Each mTracker uses price assisted decision making by
utilizing dynamics that consider the marginal payoff of for-
warding traffic to that of retaining traffic in the same domain
as the mTracker. Several such rational dynamics have been de-
veloped in the field of game theory that studies the behavior of
selfish users. We present our system model with its simplifying
assumptions in Section III. We then design a system in which
the actions of these mTrackers, each seeking to maximize
their own payoffs, actually result in ensuring lowest cost of
the system as a whole. The scheme, presented in Section IV,
involves implicit learning of capacities through probing and
backoff through a rational control scheme known as replicator
dynamics [12], [13]. We present a game theoretic framework
for our system in Section IV-A and show using Lyapunov
techniques that the vector of split probabilities converges to
a provably optimal state wherein the total cost in terms of
delay and traffic-exchange is minimized. Further, this state is
a Wardrop equilibrium [14].
We then consider a subsidiary problem of achieving fair
division of resources among different mTrackers through ad-
mission control in Section V. The objective here is to ensure
that some level of fairness is maintained among the users in
different mTracker domains, while at the same time ensuring
that the costs in the system are not too high. Admission
control implies that not all users in all domains would be
allowed to enter the system, but it should be implemented in
a manner that is fair to users in different mTracker domains.
The mTracker takes admission control decisions based on
the marginal disutility caused by users to the system. Users
interested in the file would approach the mTracker that would
decide whether or not to admit the user into the system. We
show that our mTracker admission control optimally achieves
fairness amongst users, while maintaining low system cost.
Note that switching off admission control would still imply
1We presented some basic ideas on the system as a poster [10].
that the total system cost is minimized by mTrackers, but this
could be high if the offered load were high.
We simulate our system both using Matlab simulations in
Section VI to validate our analysis, as well as ns-2 simulations
in Section VII to show a plausible implementation of the
system as a whole. The simulations strongly support our
architectural decisions. We conclude with ideas on the future
in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been much recent work on P2P systems and traffic
management, and we provide a discussion of work that is
closely related to our problem. Fluid models of P2P systems,
and the multi-phase (transient/steady state) behavior has been
developed in [11], [15]. The results show how supply of a
file correlates with its demand, and it is essentially transient
delays that dominate.
Traffic management and load balancing have become im-
portant as P2P networks grow in size. There has been work
on traffic management for streaming traffic [16]–[18]. In par-
ticular, [16] focuses on server-assisted streaming, while [17],
[18] aim at fair resource allocation to peers using optimization-
decomposition.
Closest to our setting is work such as [7]–[9], that study the
need to localize traffic within ISP domains. In [7], the focus
is on allowing only local communications and optimizing the
performance by careful peer selection, while [8] develops an
optimization framework to balance load across ISPs using cost
information. A different approach is taken in [9], wherein peers
are selected based on inputs on nearness provided by CDNs (if
a CDN directs two peers to the same cache, they are probably
near by).
Pricing and market mechanisms for P2P systems are of
significant interest, and work such as [19] use ideas of currency
exchange between peers that can be used to facilitate file trans-
fers. The system we design uses prices between mTrackers that
map to real-world costs of traffic exchange, but do not have
currency exchanges between peers which still use BitTorrent
style bilateral barter.
III. THE MULTITRACK SYSTEM
MultiTrack is a hybrid P2P network architecture similar to
BitTorrent [6], [20] in many ways, and we first review some
control elements of BitTorrent. In the BitTorrent architecture
a file is divided into multiple chunks, and there exists at least
one Tracker for each file that keeps track of peers that contain
the file in its entirety (such peers are called seeds) or some
chunks of it (such peers are called downloaders). A new peer
that wants to download a file needs to first locate a Tracker
corresponding to the file. Information about Trackers for a file
(among other information) is contained in .torrent files, which
are hosted at free servers. Thus, the peer downloads the .torrent
file, and locates a Tracker using this file.
When a peer sends a request to a Tracker corresponding
to the file it wants, the Tracker returns the addresses of a set
of peers (seeds and downloaders) that the new peer should
contact in order to download the file. The peer then connects
to a subset of the given peers and downloads chunks of the file
from them. While downloading the file, a peer sends updates
to the Tracker about its download status (number of chunks
uploaded and downloaded). Hence, a tracker knows about the
state of each peer that is present in its peer cloud (or swarm).
The MultiTrack architecture consists of BitTorrent-like
trackers, which we call mTrackers. We associate one or
more mTrackers to each ISP, with each mTracker controlling
access to its own peer cloud. Note that all these mTrackers
are identified with the same file. Unlike BitTorrent Trackers,
mTrackers are aware of each other and form an overlay
network among themselves. Each mTracker consists of two
different modules:
1) Admission control: Unlike the BitTorrent tracker which
has no control over admission decisions of peers, the
mTracker can decide whether or not to admit a particular
peer into the system. Once admitted, the peer is either
served locally or is forwarded to a different mTracker
based on the decision taken by the mTracker.
2) Traffic management: This module of the mTracker,
takes a decision on whether to forward a new peer into
its own peer cloud (at relatively low cost, but possibly
poor delay performance) or to another mTracker (at
higher cost, but potentially higher performance).
The rationale behind this architecture is as follows. At any
time, a peer cloud has a capacity associated with it, based
on the maximum upload bandwidth of a peer in the cloud
and the total number of chunks present at all the peers in the
cloud (seeds and downloaders). In general, a peer-cloud has
two phases of operation [11]—a transient phase where the
available capacity is less than the demand (in other words,
not enough peers with a copy of the file), and a steady state
phase, where the available capacity is greater than the capacity
required to satisfy demand. Thus, a peer cloud can be thought
of as a server with changing service capacity. We balance load
among different peer clouds located in different ISPs, taking
into account the transit cost associated with traffic exchange.
We assume time scale separation between the two modes—
traffic management and admission control, of the mTracker.
Our assumption is that the capacity of a P2P system remains
roughly constant over intervals of time, with capacity changes
seen at the end of these time periods. We divide system
dynamics into three time scales:
1) Large: The capacity of the peer cloud associated with
each mTracker changes at this time scale.
2) Medium: mTrackers take admission control decisions
at this time scale. They could increase or decrease the
number of admitted peers based on feedback from the
system. We will study dynamics at this time scale in
Section V.
3) Small: mTrackers split the demand that they see among
the different options (mTrackers visible to them) at this
time scale. Thus, they change the probability of sending
peers to their own peer-cloud or to other mTrackers at
this time scale. We study these dynamics in Section IV.
Note that a medium time unit comprises of many small time
units and a large time unit comprises of many medium time
units. The artifice of splitting dynamics into these time scales
allows us to design each control loop while assuming that
certain system parameters remain constant during the interval.
In the following sections, we present the design and analysis
of our different system components.
IV. MTRACKER: TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
The objective of the mTracker’s Traffic Management module
is to split the demand that it sees among the different options
(other mTrackers, and its own peer cloud) that it has. Since
each mTracker is associated with a different ISP domain, it
would like to minimize the cost seen by that ISP, and yet
maintain a good delay performance for its users.
As mentioned in the last section, peer-clouds can be in
either transient or steady-state based on whether the demand
seen is greater than or less than the available capacity. An
mTracker in the transient mode would like to offload some
of its demand, while mTrackers in the steady-state mode can
accept load. Thus, each mTracker j in the transient mode
maintains a split probability vector ~ˆyj = [yˆ1j . . . yˆ
Q
j ], where
Q is the total number of mTrackers, and some of the yij could
be zero. We assume that the demand seen by mTracker j is a
Poisson process of rate xj . Thus, splitting traffic according
to ~ˆyj would produce Q Poisson processes, each with rate
xij , yijxj (i = 1, ...Q).
Now, each mTracker in the steady-state mode can accept
traffic from mTrackers that are transient. It could, of course,
prioritize or reserve capacity for its own traffic; we assume
here that it does so, and the balance capacity available (in
users served per unit time) of this steady state mTracker is
Ci. Then the demand seen at each such mTracker i is the sum
of Poisson processes that arrive at it, whose rate is simply∑Q
l=1 x
i
l. We assume that delay seen by each peer sent to
mTracker i is convex increasing in load, and for illustration
use the M/M/1 delay function
1
Ci −∑Ql=1 xil . (1)
Note that, peers from different transient mTrackers are not
allowed to communicate with each other at the steady state
mTracker to which they are forwarded. Thus, a peer that is
forwarded from one ISP domain to another is only allowed to
communicate with peers located in that ISP domain.
Now, the steady state mTrackers are disinterested players
in the system, and would like to minimize the total delay of
the system. They could charge an additional price that would
act as a congestion signal to mTrackers that forward traffic to
them. Such a congestion price should reflect the ill-effect that
increasing the load by one mTracker has on the others. What
should such a price look like? Now, consider the expression
D(z) =
1
Ci − zi , (2)
which is the general form of the delay seen by each user at
mTracker i. The elasticity of delay with arrival rate zi
∂D(zi)
∂zi
zi
D(zi)
=
zi
Ci − zi . (3)
The elasticity gives the fractional change in delay for a
fractional change in load, and can be thought of as the cost
of increasing load on the users. In other words, if the load is
increased by any one mTracker, all the others would also be
hurt by this quantity. Expressing the above in terms of delay
(multiplying by total delay) to ensure that all units are in delay,
the elasticity per unit rate per unit time at mTracker i is just∑Q
l=1 x
i
l
(Ci −∑Ql=1 xil)2 . (4)
The above quantity represents the ill effect that increasing the
load per unit time has on the delay experienced on all users at
mTracker i. The delay cost (1) is the disutility for using the
mTracker, while the congestion cost (4) is the disutility caused
to others using the mTracker. The mTracker can charge this
price to each mTracker that forward peers to it.
Since mTrackers belong to different ISP domains, forward-
ing demand from one mTracker to the other is not free. We
assume that the transit cost per unit rate of forwarding demand
from mTracker j to mTracker i is pij . Thus, the payoff of
mTracker j due to forwarding traffic to mTracker i per unit
rate per unit time is given by the sum of transit cost pij with
the delay cost (1) and congestion price (4), which yields a
total payoff per unit rate per unit time of
1
Ci −∑Ql=1 xil + pij +
∑Q
l=1 x
i
l
(Ci −∑Ql=1 xil)2 . (5)
The mTracker would like as small a payoff as possible.
In the next subsections we will develop a population game
model for our system, and show how rational dynamics when
coupled with the payoff function given above naturally results
in minimizing the total system cost (delay cost plus transit
cost). A good reference on population games is [21].
A. MultiTrack Population Game
A population game G, with a set Q = {1, ..., Q} of non-
atomic populations of players is defined by the following
entities:
1) a mass, xj ∀j ∈ Q,
2) a strategy or action set, Sj = {1, ..., Sj} ∀j ∈ Q and
3) a payoff, F ij ∀j ∈ Q and ∀i ∈ Sj .
By a non-atomic population, we mean that the contribution of
each member of the population is infinitesimal.
In the MultiTrack Game each mTracker is a player and
the options available to each mTracker are other mTrackers’
peer cloud or its own peer cloud. Let ~x = [x1, . . . xQ] be
the total load vector of the system at the small time scale,
where xj ∀ j ∈ Q is the total arrival rate of new peer
requests (or mass) at mTracker j. A strategy distribution of
an mTracker j ∈ Q is a split of its load xj among different
mTrackers including itself, represented as ~xj = [x1j . . . x
Q
j ],
where
∑Q
i=1 x
i
j = xj . If a mTracker j is not connected to
mTracker i (or if it does not want to use mTracker i), then the
rate xij = 0. We denote the vector of strategies being used by
all the mTrackers as X = [~x1 . . . ~xQ]. The vector X represents
the state of the system and it changes continuously with time.
Let the space of all possible states of a system for a given
load vector be denoted as X, i.e X ∈ X.
The payoff (per unit rate per unit time) of forwarding
requests from mTracker j to i, when the state of the system is
X is denoted by F ij (X) ∈ R and is assumed to be continuous
and differentiable. As developed above this payoff is
F ij (X) =
1
Ci −∑Ql=1 xil + pij +
∑Q
l=1 x
i
l
(Ci −∑Ql=1 xil)2 . (6)
Recall that mTrackers want to keep payoff as small as possi-
ble.
A commonly used concept in non-cooperative games in the
context of infinitesimal players, is the Wardrop equilibrium
[14]. Consider any strategy distribution ~xj = [x1j , ..., x
Sj
j ].
There would be some elements which are non-zero and others
which are zero. We call the strategies corresponding to the
non-zero elements as the strategies used by population j.
Definition 1 A state Xˆ is a Wardrop equilibrium if for any
population j ∈ Q, all strategies being used by the members of
j yield the same marginal payoff to each member of j, whereas
the marginal payoff that would be obtained by members of j
is higher for all strategies not used by population j.
In the context of our MultiTrack game the above definition of
Wardrop equilibrium is characterized by the following relation:
F rj (Xˆ) ≤ F ij (Xˆ) ∀ r ∈ Qˆj and i ∈ Q
Where Qˆj ⊂ Q is the set of all mTrackers used by population
j in a strategy distribution ˆ˜xj.
The above concept refers to an equilibrium condition; the
question arises as to how the system actually arrives at such
a state. One model of population dynamics is Replicator
Dynamics [12]. The rate of increase of x˙ij/x
i
j of the strategy
i is a measure of its evolutionary success. Following ideas
of Darwinism, we may express this success as the difference
in fitness F ij (X) of the strategy i and the average fitness∑Q
r=1 x
r
jF
r
j (X)/xj of the population j. Then we obtain
x˙ij
xij
= average fitness - fitness of s.
Then the dynamics used to describe changes in the mass of
population j playing strategy s is given by
x˙ij = x
i
j
( 1
xj
Q∑
r=1
xrjF
r
j (X)− F ij (X)
)
. (7)
The above expression implies that a population would increase
the mass of a successful strategy and decrease the mass of a
less successful one. It is called the replicator equation after
the tenet “like begets like”. Note that the total mass of the
population j is constant. We design our mTracker Traffic
Management module around Replicator Dynamics (7).
B. Convergence of mTracker dynamics
We define the total cost in the system to be the sum of the
total system delay plus the total transit cost. In other words,
we have weighted delay costs and transit costs equally when
determining their contribution to the system cost. We could,
of course, use any convex combination of the two without any
changes to the system design. Hence using the M/M/1 delay
model at each tracker and adding transit costs, the total system
cost when the system is in state X is given as:
C(X) =
Q∑
i=1
{ ∑Q
r=1 x
i
r
Ci −∑Ql=1 xil +
Q∑
r=1
pirx
i
r
}
. (8)
Note that the cost is convex and increasing in the load. We will
show that the above expression acts as a Lyapunov function
for the system.
Theorem 1: The system of mTrackers that follow replicator
dynamics with payoffs given by (6) is globally asymptotically
stable.
Proof: We prove the system stability using Lyapunov
Theory with C(X) defined in (8) as the Lyapunov function.
From (6) and (8), ∂C
∂xij
= F ij (X), hence
C˙(X) =
Q∑
i=1
Q∑
j=1
∂C
∂xij
x˙ij =
Q∑
i=1
Q∑
j=1
F ij (X)x˙
i
j , (9)
Now, let X˜ be the set of states such that,
C˙(X) = 0,∀ X ∈ X˜
From (9) it is evident that C˙(X) = 0, if:
F ij (X) = 0 or (10)(
x˙ij = 0
)⇒ 1
xj
Q∑
r=1
xrjF
r
j = F
i
j ∀ i, j ∈ Q (11)
Thus, X˜ is the set of equilibrium states of replicator dynamics.
We will show that C˙(X) < 0 ∀ X /∈ X˜ .
From (9) and (7) we have
C˙(X) =
Q∑
i=1
Q∑
j=1
F ijx
i
j
(
1
xj
Q∑
r=1
xrjF
r
j − F ij
)
(12)
=
Q∑
j=1
xj
( Q∑
i=1
xij
xj
F ij
)2
−
(
Q∑
i=1
xij
xj
(F ij )
2
) (13)
Since function f(x) = x2 is convex and
∑Q
i=1
xij
xj
= 1, from
Jensen’s inequality we have, ∀ X /∈ X˜ :( Q∑
i=1
xij
xj
F ij
)2
−
(
Q∑
i=1
xij
xj
(F ij )
2
) < 0 ∀ j ∈ Q
Thus, C˙(X) < 0, ∀ X /∈ X˜ and the system is globally
asymptotically stable [22].
While replicator dynamics is a simple model, it has a draw-
back: during the different iterations of replicator dynamics,
if the value of xij , the rate of forwarding requests from
mTracker j to mTracker i becomes zero then it remains
zero forever. Thus, a strategy could become extinct when
replicator dynamics is used and its stationary point might not
be a Wardrop equilibrium. To avoid this problem, we can use
another kind of dynamics called Brown-von Neuman-Nash
(BNN) Dynamics, which is described as:
x˙iq = xqγ
i
q − xiq
Q∑
j=1
γjq (14)
where, γiq = max
{
F iq(X)−
1
xq
Q∑
i=1
xiqF
i
q(X), 0
}
(15)
denotes the excess payoff to strategy i relative to the average
payoff in population q. We can show that the system of
mTrackers that follow BNN dynamics is globally asymptot-
ically stable in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
We have just shown that the total system cost acts as a
Lyapunov function for the system. It should not come as
a surprise then, that the cost-minimizing state is a Wardrop
equilibrium. We prove this formally in the next subsection.
C. Cost efficiency of mTrackers
In previous work on selfish routing (e.g. [23]), it was
shown that the Wardrop equilibrium does not result in efficient
system performance. This inefficiency is referred to as the
price of anarchy, and it is primarily due to selfish user-
strategies. However, work on population games [21] suggests
that carefully devised price signals would indeed result in
efficient equilibria. We show now that the Wardrop equilibrium
attained by mTrackers is efficient for the system as a whole.
The objective of our system is to minimize the total cost for
a given load vector ~x = [x1, . . . , xQ]. Here the total cost in the
system is C(X) and is defined in (8). This can be represented
as the following constrained minimization problem:
min
X
C(X) (16)
subject to,
∑Q
i=1 x
i
j = xj ∀ j ∈ Q (17)
xij ≥ 0 (18)
The Lagrange dual associated with the above is
L(λ,X) = max
λ,h
min
X
(
C(X) − (19)
Q∑
j=1
λj
( Q∑
i=1
xij − xj
)
−
Q∑
i=1
Q∑
j=1
hijx
i
j
)
where hij ≥ 0 and λj , ∀ i, j,∈ Q are the dual variables. Now
the above dual problem gives the following Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker first order conditions:
∂L
∂xij
(λ,X?) = 0 ∀ i, j ∈ Q (20)
and
hijx
?i
j = 0 ∀ i, j ∈ Q (21)
where X? is the global minimum for the primal problem (16).
Hence, from (20) we have
∂C
∂xij
(X?)− λj ∂(
PQ
i=1 x
?i
j −x?j )
∂xij
+ hij = 0 ∀ i, j ∈ Q
⇒ ∂C
∂xij
(X?) = λj + hij ∀ i, j ∈ Q (22)
We know from the definition of payoff (6) that ∂C
∂xij
(X) =
F ij (X). Thus from (22) we have
F ij (X
?) = λj + hij ∀ i, j ∈ Q (23)
From (21), it follows that
F ij (X
?) = λj when x?ij > 0 ∀ i, j ∈ Q (24)
and
F ij (X
?) = λj + hij when x
?i
j = 0 ∀ i, j ∈ Q (25)
Now, consider the replicator dynamics (7), at stationary point
we have x˙ij = 0. Thus,
Fˆj = F ij (Xˆ) ∀ i, j ∈ Q (26)
or xˆij = 0,
where
Fˆj , 1xˆj
∑Q
r=1 xˆ
r
jF
r
j (Xˆ) ∀ j ∈ Q, (27)
and Xˆ denotes a stationary point. The above equations imply
that for mTracker j the per unit cost of forwarding traffic to
all the other mTrackers that it uses is the same. However, for
an option i that it does not use, the rate of forwarding xij is
0 or equivalently, the cost is more than the average payoff.
Finally, we observe that the conditions required for Wardrop
equilibrium are identical to the KKT first order conditions
(24)-(25) of the minimization problem (16) when
Fˆj = λj ∀ j ∈ Q, (28)
which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The solution of the minimization problem in
(16) is identical to the Wardrop equilibrium of the non-
cooperative potential game G.
Proof: From the above discussion we know that the KKT
conditions of (16) satisfy the Wardrop equilibrium conditions
of the game G. Thus, to finish this proof all we need to show
is that there is no duality gap between the primal (16) and the
dual (19) problems. This follows immediately from convexity
of the total system cost.
V. MTRACKER: ADMISSION CONTROL
In the previous section we witnessed how each mTracker
tries to reduce the cost in its peer cloud by forwarding
requests to other mTrackers. However, minimizing the total
delay does not mean that it is bounded. In order to ensure
acceptable delay performance, we provide admission control
functionality to each mTracker. The mTracker takes admission
control decisions in the medium time scale; the mTracker’s
demand splitting is assumed to have converged to yield the
lowest cost split at every instant at this time scale. In some
ways the admission control mode supplements natural market
dynamics—if the delay experienced by requesters were un-
bearably high, they would simply abort, causing the system to
recover. However, such dynamics might cause large swings in
quality over time; the mTracker’s admission control precludes
the occurrence of such swings.
We could formulate an admission control problem, enforc-
ing hard constraints on the acceptable system cost, as a convex
optimization problem shown below:
max
~x
∑Q
j=1 wj log xj (29)
subject to, C?(~x) ≤ κ (30)
xj ≥ 0
where ~x is the load vector and C?(~x) is the minimum value
of the optimization problem (16) for a given load ~x. We can
easily show that the constraint set is (29) is convex.
Lemma 3: The set of all load vectors ~x, satisfying the
inequality constraint, C?(~x) ≤ κ is convex.
Proof: Let ~x and ~y be two load vectors such that,
C?(~x) ≤ κ and C?(~y) ≤ κ (31)
Let Xmin and Ymin be the states, corresponding to load
vectors ~x and ~y respectively, which results in minimum cost
to the system, i.e.,
C(Xmin) = C?(~x) and C(Ymin) = C?(~y) (32)
Consider,
C(αXmin + (1− α)Ymin) ≤ αC(Xmin) + (1− α)C(Ymin) (33)
the above inequality follows from the convexity of C(X).
Using Eqns(31) and (32), we get:
C(αXmin + (1− α)Ymin) ≤ αC?(~x) + (1− α)C?(~y) (34)
≤ ακ+ (1− α)κ (35)
≤ κ (36)
if ~z = α~x+ (1− α)~y, then from the definition of C?
C(Zmin) = C?(~z)C?(~z) = C(Zmin) (37)
where Zmin is the state of the system, corresponding to load
~z, when the cost is minimum.
Clearly we can represent any state Z, corresponding to the
load vector ~z, in the form of αX + (1 − α)Y , and thus it
follows from the definition of C? and Eqn(36) that:
C?(α~x+ (1− α)~y) ≤ C(αXmin + (1− α)Ymin) ≤ κ (38)
Thus the set is convex.
If we think of
∑
j wj log xj as the total system utility, then
C?(~x) is the total system disutility. Instead of hard constraints
on the cost, we relax the problem after the manner of [24],
[25] to simply ensure that the difference of utility and disutility
(the net utility) is as large as possible.
max
~x
∑Q
j=1 wj log xj − C?(~x) (39)
subject to, xj ≥ 0
A gradient ascent type controller that could be used to solve
the above problem is
x˙j = wj − xj ∂C
?
∂xj
∀ j ∈ Q (40)
To determine the second term above, we use
∂C?
∂xj
=
∑
i∈Q
∂C(X?)
∂xij
∂xij
∂xj
+
∑
k∈Q,k 6=j
∑
i∈Q
∂C(X?)
∂xik
∂xik
∂xj
∀ j ∈ Q (41)
=
∑
i∈Q
F ij (X
?)
∂xij
∂xj
+
∑
k∈Q,k 6=j
∑
i∈Q
F ik(X
?)
∂xik
∂xj
∀ j ∈ Q (42)
When the system is in Wardrop equilibrium (X?) all the op-
tions i used by j yield the same payoff hence, F ij (X
?) = F ?j .
For the options r that were not used
∂xrj
∂xj
= 0 at state X?.
Further,
∑
i∈Q x
i
j = xj and hence
∑
i∈Q
∂xij
∂xj
= 1. Also,∑
i∈Q
∂xik
∂xj
= 0 ∀k 6= j. Thus, we just have
∂C?
∂xj
= F ?j ∀ j ∈ Q (43)
and the controller equation is given as:
x˙j = (wj − xjF ?j ) ∀ j ∈ Q. (44)
Under this admission control loop, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4: Under the time scale separation assumption,
the mTracker system with dynamics (44) is globally asymp-
totically stable.
Proof: We use the following Lyapunov function
Z(~x) = V (~ˆx)− V (~x) (45)
where V (~x) =
Q∑
j=1
wj log xj − C?(~x) (46)
which is strictly concave, with ~ˆx is its unique maximum.
Differentiating Z(~x) we obtain
Z˙ = −
Q∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
x˙j . (47)
Then from (46) and (44)
∂V
∂xj
=
wj
xj
− ∂C
?(~x)
∂xj
= x˙jxj (48)
∴ Z˙ = −
Q∑
j=1
x˙2j
xj
≤ 0 ∀ ~x, (49)
with Z˙ = 0 when the system is in equilibrium. Thus, the
system is globally asymptotically stable [22].
Finally, we note that the equilibrium conditions of the con-
troller (44) are the same as the KKT conditions of the convex
optimization problem (39). Hence, the controller succeeds in
maximizing the required net utility.
VI. MATLAB SIMULATIONS
Figure 2 shows the per unit payoffs, corresponding to T2. As
expected, the per unit payoffs converge to identical values. We
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Fig. 2. The trajectory of payoffs of mTracker T2 for the 2 options available
(local swarm and T1’s swarm). The payoffs eventually equalize, showing that
a Wardrop equilibrium has been attained.
perform simulations on the simple overlay topology illustrated
in Figure 1. Our objective is to validate our analytical results,
and use the resulting insights to construct a realistic ns-2
implementation in the next section. Our system consists of
3 mTrackers (T1,T2 and T3). The mTracker-T1 is assumed
to be in steady state (i.e. it has more capacity than demand
in its peer swarm) and the other mTrackers T2 and T3 are
in a transient state. Thus, T2 and T3 may forward traffic to
T1. Our simulation parameters are chosen as follows. The
initial arrival rates at the mTrackers are x1 = 10 users/time,
x2 = 20 users/time and x3 = 20 users/time, while the
available capacities (fixed) are C1 = 30 users/time, C2 = 20
users/time and C3 = 20 users/time, respectively. There is a
transit price for traffic forwarding between mTrackers, and
these values are chosen as p12 = 2 unit and p
1
3 = 1 unit.
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Fig. 3. The trajectory of total system cost in the system. As expected, it
decreases over time to a minimum.
We first validate the dynamics of the mTrackers at the
small time scale. Hence, the arrival rate at each mTracker
remains fixed, and as in Section IV and they each use replicator
dynamics in order to balance their payoffs among available
options. We expect that (i) the per unit payoff for all available
options to an mTracker should eventually be equal, and (ii)
the total cost of the system would decrease to a minimum.
We observe similar convergence for mTracker T3. We then
plot the trajectory of total system cost C(X)2 in Figure 3. As
expected it decreases with time, and converges to a minimum.
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Fig. 4. The trajectory of net utility of the system when mTracker uses
admission control. The net utility converges to a maximum.
We performed simulations at the medium time scale for the
admission control module and observed that the net utility of
the system (as defined in (39) converges, shown in Figure 4.
While our Matlab simulations suggest that our system
design is valid, they do not capture the true P2P interactions
within each peer-cloud. In the next section, we implement
MultiTrack using ns-2 in order to experiment with a more
accurate representation of the system.
VII. NS-2 EXPERIMENTS
We implemented the MultiTrack system on ns-2 to observe
its performance in a more realistic setting. Again, we use the
same network shown in Figure 1, with 3 mTrackers T1,T2 and
T3. However, we now explicitly model peer behavior using
a BitTorrent model. We use a flow level BitTorrent model
developed by Eger et al., [26]3, and each peer leaves the sys-
tem after completing its download. We extended the existing
BitTorrent Tracker model to support mTracker functionality.
We estimate the delay and congestion price at each
mTracker during every small time scale as follows:
1) Delay: The per unit delay in each mTracker’s peer cloud
is measured by calculating the average download rate
obtained by the peers in the current time slot, including
the peers that finished service during this time slot. The
delay experienced is the reciprocal of this download rate.
We maintain an exponential moving average of the delay
with 75% weight to the delay in current time slot and
25% weight to the previous value
2Recall that this is the sum of total delay plus total transit cost.
3Here only flows are simulated, and the actual dynamics of transport
protocol, like TCP, and network protocol, like IP, are ignored in the interest
of lowered simulation time.
2) Congestion Price: The congestion price with delay D
and arrival rate z is given as ∂D∂z × z, which follows
from the elasticity (3). We measure the change in delay
and change in arrival rate from the previous and current
time slot to calculate the congestion price.
In our simulation, each peer has an upload capacity of
3000 kbps and their download capacity is not restricted. The
requested file size is 5 MB and each chunk has a size
of 256 kB. Peer arrivals are created according to Poisson
processes of different rates. T1 has 200 seeds in its peer swarm
while T2 and T3 have 5 seeds each. We fix the initial arrival
rates to be x1 = 3 users/sec, x2 = 5 users/sec and x3 = 7
users/sec, set transit costs to be p12 = 20 and p
1
3 = 10.
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Fig. 5. The trajectory of payoffs of mTracker T3 for the 2 options available
(local swarm and T1’s swarm). The payoffs eventually equalize, showing that
a Wardrop equilibrium has been attained.
We first simulate the mTracker with admission control
disabled so as to show the convergence of our mTracker
traffic management module. We set the update interval for
the mTracker to be 8 sec. Thus, each mTracker calculates
the splitting probabilities for the different options at this
frequency. We simulate the system for 320 sec.
First we show the payoff convergence of the transient
mTrackers. Figure 5, shows the convergence of payoffs of
mTracker T3 for its two options, local swarm and T1’s swarm,
thus showing that the system attains Wardrop equilibrium. We
observed similar payoff convergence for other mTrackers.
Next we plot the total cost (transit price and delay cost)
of our MultiTrack system. The temporal evolution of cost is
shown in Figure 6. The impact of using MultiTrack is clearly
illustrated here. The system without traffic splitting has a high
cost due to increased user delays, while traffic splitting without
regard to prices has a high cost due to excessive transit traffic.
MultiTrack takes both transit price and user delay into account,
and hence achieves the lowest possible cost.
We implemented the mTracker’s admission control module
in ns-2. Here, at each time step the mTracker decides the
admission rate (based on the dynamics developed in Section
V). Admission control is done at 40 sec intervals, while the
traffic management module is run at 8 sec intervals during this
interval. We simulate the system for 2000 sec. We expect that
the net utility of the system (as defined in (39)) would increase
to a maximum, which is what we observe in Figure 7.
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Fig. 6. The trajectory of total system cost. Without traffic splitting, the cost
(delay plus transit price) is high. With traffic splitting without regard to price,
the delay is low but transit price is high, causing high cost. MultiTrack takes
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Fig. 7. The trajectory of net utility of the system when mTracker uses
admission control.
In Figure 8 we can see the convergence of arrival rates
of each mTracker, thus finding the optimum arrival rate into
each mTracker for a fixed capacity. Since all mTrackers have
identical utility, we see that T1 dominates as its price to access
its own (resource rich) swarm is zero. Finally, we note that
changing the time scales for faster responses does not seem to
unduly impact stability. In particular, reducing the small time
scale from 8 to 4 sec does not appreciably change our results.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
As the popularity of P2P systems has grown, it has become
clear that aligning incentives between the system performance
in terms of the user QoS, and the transit costs faced by ISPs
will be increasingly important. Fundamental to this problem
is the realization that resources may be distributed geograph-
ically, and hence the marginal performance gain obtained by
accessing a resource is offset in part by the marginal cost
of transit in accessing it. In this paper, we consider delay
and transit costs as two dimensions and attempt to design a
system—MultiTrack–that attains an optimal operating point.
Our system consists of mTrackers that form an overlay
network among themselves and act as gateways to peer-clouds.
The load balancing module takes decisions based on whether
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Fig. 8. The trajectory of arrival rates for all mTrackers. The utility of each
mTracker is weighed equally to a value of 10.
the marginal decrease in delay obtained by forwarding a
user to a resource rich peer-cloud is offset by the marginal
increase in its transit cost. We show that a simple price-based
controllers can ensure that the total system cost is minimized
in spite of each mTracker being selfish. The admission control
module calculates the tradeoff between the marginal utility in
increasing the admission rate in a particular ISP domain to
the marginal increase in system cost, to decide the admission
rates into that ISP domain. It thus allows the correct arrival
rate of users into the system to attain optimal performance.
We validated our system design using Matlab simulations,
and implemented the system on ns-2 to conduct more realistic
experiments. We showed that our system significantly outper-
forms a system in which costs are the only control dimension
(localized traffic only). In the future, we will conduct testbed
experiments on MultiTrack in a real-world setting.
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